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E. Attorney General May Authorize Lethal Injections
At the time the jury imposed the death sentences, no federal statute
provided authorization for the "specific means of executing such sen-
tences."'83 Yet, the Attorney General of the United States had promul-
gated regulations that death sentences imposed under § 848(e) should be
executed "by intravenous injection of a lethal substance or substances in
a quantity sufficient to cause death."84 The trial court stayed the execu-
tion on the grounds that the Attorney General's regulation was ultra vires
because Congress possessed the exclusive power to prescribe the means
83 Id. at 901-902.
84 Id. at 902 (citations omitted).
by which federal death sentences should be carried out. The court
rejected this argument, stating that Congress's power was not exclusive
and that Congress had not preempted the issue, expressly or impliedly.
85
In addition, the court held that application of the regulation to the
defendants did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it was
promulgated after the commission of the capital offenses at issue.
86
Summary and Analysis by:
David T. Mclndoe
85 Id. at 902-903.
86 Id. at 903.
BARNABEI v. COMMONWEALTH
1996 WL 517733 (Va. 1996)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Derek Rocco Bamabei was indicted for rape1 and for capital murder
in the commission of a rape.2 At trial, the Commonwealth introduced
items of circumstantial evidence and various forensic tests tending to
show that on the night of the murder, (1) the victim was with the
defendant in the defendant's room, (2) the defendant and the victim had
sexual intercourse, and (3) the victim was killed in defendant's room
before her body was found in the river.3 The sole witness to offer any
evidence from which the jury could infer that a rape occurred was the
Commonwealth's medical examiner. Although Bamabei had moved
pre-trial for the appointment of a forensic pathologist to assist the
defense, the trial court denied Barnabei's motion.4 The jury found the
defendant guilty of both rape and capital murder.
5
At the sentencing phase, Bamabei's ex-wife was one of two
witnesses to testify for the Commonwealth about various threats and acts
of violence that Bamabei had allegedly inflicted upon her. Barnabei
objected to her testimony as to specific incidents, arguing that such
testimony went beyond the scope of the notice given by the Common-
wealth pursuant to Va. Code § 19.2-264.3:2.6 The trial court overruled
1 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-61(A).
2 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(5).
3 Barnabeiv. Commonwealth, 1996 WL517733, *1-*4 (Va. 1996).
4 Id. at *5.
5 Id. at*1.
6 § 19.2-264.3:2 provides that if the Commonwealth intends to
introduce evidence of any unadjudicated acts allegedly attributable to the
defendant, the Commonwealth must provide pre-trial notice to the
defendant of such intention, including a description of the unadjudicated
acts.
7 Barnabei, 1996 WL 517733 at *11.
8 Id. at*l.
9 Id. at *5.
10 The court rejected all of defendant's assignments of error. Some
of the rulings provide little if any guidance because they apply broad,
settled principles of law to facts that are specific to the case being
Bamabei's objection and his motion for a mistrial and admitted further
testimony from his ex-wife.7 At the close of the evidence, the jury
sentenced Bamabei to death based upon both the "vileness" and "future
dangerousness" predicates. 8
Barnabei appealed his capital murder conviction and death sen-
tence, challenging, among other things, the trial court's refusal to appoint
a defense forensic expert and the admission of a portion of his ex-wife's
testimony. 9
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected both of Bamabei's chal-
lenges. In upholding the trial court's refusal to appoint a defense forensic
pathologist expert, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that Bamabei
failed to make the necessary particularized showing that would have
entitled him to such an expert. The court upheld the admission of the
testimony of Bamabei's ex-wife, ruling that the notice given by the
Commonwealth pursuant to § 19.2-264.3:2 was sufficient and that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony.
10
reviewed. Issues that will not be addressed in this summary include:
(1) harmlessness of prosecution error in withholding exculpatory
evidence; (2) removal of two jurors for cause by the Commonwealth; (3)
denial of defendant's proposed jury instructions on mitigating factors
and sentence alternatives; and (4) statutory review of imposition of death
sentence.
The court also rejected Barnabei's claim that the trial court erred in
refusing to instruct the jury that he would not be eligible for parole for at
least 25 years. However, it is important to note that defense counsel
preserved this type of claim pursuant to Simmons v. South Carolina, 114
S. Ct. 2187 (1994). For treatment of the implications of Simmons, see
Pohl and Turner, If at First You Don't Succeed: The Real and Potential
Impact of Simmons v. South Carolina in Virginia, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 28 (1994).
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ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Default
On direct appeal, Bamabei assigned 53 errors, but failed to brief
twenty-eight of these errors, and thus waived consideration of them.II In
order to preserve every issue on appeal, it is necessary to object at trial,
assign each issue as error, and brief each issue on appeal. Although the
Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia impose a 50 page limit on
appellate briefs, defense counsel may move for relief from the 50 page
limit in order to effectively brief every assignment of error.
12
Bamabei also defaulted two issues because he failed to object at
trial. On appeal, Barnabei argued that the jury instructions regarding
"vileness" and "future dangerousness" were vague and incomplete, and
that the verdict was not "meaningfully or rationally reviewable" because
the verdict contained the terms "and/or." 13 However, Barabei failed to
object both when the instructions were given and when the verdict was
returned by the jury or when the judgment was entered thereon. Thus,
such issues were technically defaulted according to Rule 5:25.14
However, in rejecting Bamabei's contention that the jury instruc-
tions regarding the aggravating factors were unconstitutionally vague,
the Supreme Court of Virginia stated: "We previously have rejected this
contention. Adhering to our previous holdings, we again reject this
contention. ' 15 By this language, the court, in effect, ruled on the merits
of this issue. Fortunately, because the state court ruled on the merits of
this claim, the issue is probably preserved for federal appeal.
Prior to his trial, Barabei made a motion for a bill of particulars
specifying evidence that the Commonwealth intended to use in support
of the death penalty. This motion was denied. Bamabei objected to the
denial, but failed to allege federal grounds forhis objection. The Supreme
Court of Virginia found that his claim on appeal of due process denial of
notice and opportunity to defend against the Commonwealth's case for
death was defaulted. 16 In ruling that Bamabei defaulted this issue, the
Supreme Court of Virginia implicitly recognized the due process claim.
The due process claim remains unresolved by federal courts. Conse-
quently, it is important to object to the denial of a defendant's motion for
a bill of particulars, and to couch such an objection in constitutional terms
by stating that the refusal to order the bill of particulars will deny the
defendant his constitutional due process right to notice and an opportu-
nity to defend against those factors necessary to render him eligible for
the death penalty.
Finally, the court held two of Barnabei's assignments of error to be
defaulted without any explanation as to why or how the claims were
defaulted. First, the court held defaulted Barnabei's claim that the trial
court treated him unfairly and was biased in favor of the Common-
wealth. 17 In so holding without any explanation, it is unclear what
defense counsel must do to avoid default on such a claim. To be
absolutely safe, defense counsel might consider moving to recuse the
judge.
11 Barnabei v. Commonwealth, 1996 WL 517733 at *12, n. 1.
12 Rule 5:26(a) provides, in relevant part: "Except by permission
of a justice of this Court, neither the opening brief of appellant, nor the
brief of appellee, nor a brief of amicus curiae shall exceed 50 typed or 36
printed pages.... Page limits under this Rule do not include appendices."
(emphasis added)
13 Barnabei, 1996 WL 517733 at *10.
14 Rule 5:25 provides that "[e]rror will not be sustained to any
ruling of the trial court or the commission before which the case was
initially tried unless the objection was stated with reasonable certainty at
the time of the ruling, except forgood cause shown or to enable this Court
Second, the court held defaulted Barnabei's claim that the court had
an ex parte communication with a witness for the Commonwealth.
18
Although such a claim appears to raise a disputed issue of fact, the court
apparently resolved this issue without any fact-finding. It is unclear
whether Bamabei made the exparte communication claim part of the
record by noting his objection at trial. Beyond objecting to rulings, it is
of course advisable on a contested factual matter to insist upon an
evidentiary hearing at which a record is made of exactly what is disputed
and how the court resolves the dispute.
II. Ake Issues
A. Medical Examiner's Testimony as to "Force"
Prior to trial, Barnabei filed a motion in limine seeking to prohibit
the medical examiner, who conducted the autopsy of the victim, from
giving an opinion as to whether force was used to inflict any of the
injuries to the vagina or anus of the victim. In support of his motion,
Bamabei argued that such testimony would invade the province of the
jury on the ultimate issue of whether a rape had occurred. At a hearing
on the motion, the medical examiner stated that although the vaginal
bruising could have been caused only by "forcible penetration of the
vagina," there were other explanations for his findings, and that he used
the term "force" only in a medical sense. In response to questions about
a tear in the victim's anus, the medical examiner re-emphasized that he
could only say "medically" that force had been used and that it was not
for him to say "[w]hether a person would consent to force being used."
The trial court denied the motion in limine.19
At trial, however, the medical examiner testified that the vaginal
bruising was caused by a "violent penetration of that area."20 Bamabei
never objected to any of this testimony at trial. Consequently, his claim
that the medical examiner's testimony differed from his pretrial testi-
mony and that the medical examiner's testimony was beyond the scope
of his expertise was held to be procedurally defaulted.
21
In relying on its finding of procedural default, the Supreme Court of
Virginia did not decide whether the trial court erred in the first place by
denying Bamabei's motion in limine and allowing the medical examiner
to testify with regard to "force." Such a determination was crucial to this
case. Because Bamabei's capital murder conviction turned on whether a
rape had occurred, the medical examiner's testimony about force went to
an ultimate issue of fact. Without rape, Bamabei could not have been
convicted of capital murder; thus, the jury needed to find rape as an
element of the crime. Curiously, in the civil context, the Supreme Court
of Virginia has held that an expert cannot testify about matters that invade
the province of the jury as to an ultimate issue of fact.22 There is no reason
why such a principle should not also apply in the criminal context.
to attain the ends of justice."
15 Barnabei, 1996 WL 517733 at *11 (citations omitted).
16 Id. at *6.
17 Id. at *12, n. 9.
18 Id.
19 Id. at *4.
20 Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
21 Id.
22 See Paul Fletcher, Supreme Court continues limits on use of
experts, 11 Virginia Lawyer's Weekly 361, 390 (1996).
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B. Denial of Forensic Expert to the Defense
In holding that Barnabei was not entitled to a forensic pathologist
expert to assist in his defense and to rebut the medical examiner's
testimony, the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that
Bamabei failed to make the particularized showing that would
have entitled him to the appointment of an expert forensic
pathologistatthe Commonwealth's expense. Atmost, Bamabei
hoped or suspected that an expert might testify that the
injuries to [the victim's] vagina and anal opening did not
necessarily result from force. A hope or suspicion that
favorable evidence may be procured from an expert, how-
ever, is not sufficient to require appointment of an ex-
pert.23
This requirement of a pre-appointment showing that favorable
evidence will be procured contradicts the principles announced in Ake v.
Oklahoma,24 and is reinforced by the pre-Ake precedent of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
InAke, the United States Supreme Court recognized the imbalance
that exists between the resources available to a State and those of an
indigent defendant and held accordingly that the Constitution requires
the appointment and payment of a competent, independent psychiatrist
to assist the defense.25 The rationale of the Court's decision in Ake
applies to all experts reasonably necessary for an effective defense. Thus,
where the Commonwealth's case involves important expert testimony,
the courts have required the provision of a defense expert in numerous
specialties.
26
However, as the Supreme Court of Virginiaproperly recognized, an
indigent defendant's constitutional right to the appointment of an expert
is not absolute. As the court held in Husske v. Commonwealth,27 decided
the same day as Barnabei, an indigent defendant seeking the appoint-
ment of an expert "must demonstrate that the subject which necessitates
the assistance of the expert is likely to be a significant factor in his
defense."28 In order to satisfy this burden, the court held the defendant
must demonstrate: (1) that the services of an expert would materially
assist him in the preparation of his defense, and (2) that the denial of such
services would result in a fundamentally unfair trial.
29
Had the court properly applied its own test according to the
principles of Ake, Barnabei would have been required to show only that
the subject for which he requested the assistance of an expert-in this
instance, the alleged rape-was likely to be a significant factor in his
defense. He could have easily made this showing. In Barnabei, the
autopsy findings were essential to the Commonwealth's case in estab-
lishing that a rape had occurred, as the medical examiner's testimony as
23 Barnabei, 1996 WL 517733 at *6 (emphasis added).
24 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
25 470 U.S. at 76-77.
26 See, e.g.,Little v.Armontrout, 835F.2d 1240 (8thCir. 1987)(fail-
ure to appoint expert on hypnosis where prosecution used hypnotically
refreshed testimony violated due process); United States v. Bailey, 886
F.Supp. 7(S.D.W.Va. 1995) (hair, fiber, and blood experts); Williams v.
Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980) (pathologist); Bradford v. United
States, 413 F.2d 467, 474 (5th Cir. 1969) (handwriting and fingerprint
experts).
27 1996 WL 517738 (Va. 1996).
28 Id. at *6, quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83 (emphasis added).
29 Id. at *6.
30 It was undisputed that Barnabei and the victim had engaged in
aconsensual sexual relationship foraperiod oftime. Barnabei, 1996WL
to "force" was the only evidence presented by the Commonwealth from
which the jury could infer that a rape had occurred.30 That the medical
examiner's testimony was crucial in establishing that a rape had occurred
is bome out by the Supreme Court of Virginia's reliance on such
testimony to conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find
that a rape had occurred.3 1 Thus, a defense expert was critical to the
Barnabei's ability to challenge the Commonwealth's expert-both in the
cross-examination of the medical examiner and in the presentation of
independent testimony to rebut the Commonwealth's case.
Moreover, both Ake and Fourth Circuit precedent made it clear that
the required showing did not include the catch-22 requirement of
demonstrating what the expert would find before she is appointed. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Williams v. Martin,32 "[an
indigent prisoner who needs expert assistance because the subject matter
is beyond the comprehension of laymen should not be required to
present proof of what an expert would say when he is denied access
to an expert."33 Thus, the Supreme Court of Virginia ignored plain
precedent. In arguing for the appointment for a defense expert, Bamabei
was not required to show what the expert's opinion would have been, nor
was he required to show that the expert's opinion would have been
favorable to his case.
While Ake and its progeny do require a defendant to make a very
particularized showing of need, such a showing relates to the centrality
of the issue that will be contested at trial-not to what the expert would
say. For example, defense counsel must allege in the Ake motion, and be
prepared to support with evidence, the following: the type of expert
desired; the type of assistance the expert will provide; the names,
qualifications, and fees of suggested experts; the legal necessity of the
expert's assistance; the legal entitlement to defense experts; and the
inadequacy of available state experts. 34 However, the court cannot
require defense counsel to also demonstrate that favorable evidence
would be procured from the requested expert. So long as the defendant
can demonstrate that the issue for which expert assistance is requested is
critical and in dispute, the defendant has made the required showing
under Ake. For even if the defense expert does not provide favorable
evidence to the defense, the expert remains a "necessary tool" to the
defense as contemplated by Ake; that is, the expert can lend his or her
medical (or other) expertise to defense counsel in the cross-examination
of the state's expert and in contesting prosecution evidence.
M. Vague Statutory Response Under 3:2
Prior to trial, Barnabei filed a motion pursuant to § 19.2-264.3:235
to require the Commonwealth to provide notice of any unadjudicated
criminal conduct which it intended to present in the penalty phase. In
response, the Commonwealth stated that it intended to present testimony
517733 at *2.
31 Id. at *8.
32 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980).
33 618 F.2d at 1026-27 (emphasis added).
34 Monahan, Obtaining Funds for Experts in Indigent Cases,
Champion, Vol. XIII, No. 7, p. 10 (August 1989).
35 Va. Code §19.2-264.3:2 provides, in pertinent part, "Upon
motion of the defendant,... if the attorney for the Commonwealth
intends to introduce evidence during a sentencing proceeding... of a
defendant's unadjudicated criminal conduct, the attorney for the Com-
monwealth shall give notice in writing to the attorney for the defendant
of such intention. The notice shall include a description of the alleged
unadjudicated criminal conduct and, to the extent such information is
available, the time and place such conduct will be alleged to have
occurred."
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from Bamabei's ex-wife, Paula Barto. The notice alleged that, during the
time Bamabei had been married to Barto, he had "engaged in a continu-
ous course of threatening and assaultive conduct against [her], said
conduct occurring on such a continuous and regular basis that [she could
not] recall each and every specific date and occasion upon which such
threatening and assaultive conduct occurred."
36
However, during the penalty phase of the trial, Barto related one
specific incident alleging that Bamabei had attempted to have anal
intercourse with her, but she successfully had resisted the attempt.
Barnabei objected and moved for a mistrial, asserting that the
Commonwealth's notice had not adequately apprised him of the testi-
mony. The trial court overruled the objection, and Barto further testified,
over Bamabei's renewed objections, that Barabei had forced her to
have sexual intercourse with him on other particular occasions. 37 On
appeal, Bamabei contended that the trial court erred in allowing Barto to
testify about incidents that were not specifically alleged in the notice.
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed. In so ruling, even the court
could not bring itself to hold affirmatively that the notice given by the
Commonwealth was "reasonable notice" that Barnabei would face
36 Barnabei, 1996 WL 517733 at *10.
37 Id.
testimony about specific incidents of forcible anal intercourse. Rather, it
found that the allegations were "sufficient to allow the admission of her
testimony."
38
Defense counsel in Virginia should note that in so ruling, the
Supreme Court of Virginia is inviting, if not requiring, a greater burden
to be put on the trial judge. The court's holding in Barnabei requires
defense counsel not only to movefor early disclosure, but also to examine
the response given by the Commonwealth and, when the response is as
vague as it was in Barnabei, to make as many further motions as may be
required to obtain clarification. Upon receipt of the Commonwealth's
response, counsel may move in limine to limit the testimony to the scope
of what was revealed in theresponse. If defense counsel does notfile such
further motions, and the defendant is later surprised in court, Barnabei
makes clear that no relief will be granted on appeal. The responsibility
for increased litigation and delay occasioned by litigating the questions
of fair notice of unadjudicated acts rests with the Supreme Court of
Virginia.
Summary and analysis by:
Lisa M. Jenio
38 Id. at *11.
GOINS v. COMMONWEALTH
251 Va. 442, 470 S.E.2d 114 (1996)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On the morning ofOctober 14,1994, Christopher Goins and afriend
visited the home offGoins's 14year-oldex-girlfriend,TamikaJones, who
was then seven months pregnant with Goins's child. During the course
of the visit Goins apparently became upset over the pregnancy. Tamika
testified that she was in herbedroom when she heard Goins participating
in a conversation which was interrupted by gunfire. She heard multiple
gunshots and screams, then Goins appeared in her bedroom and shot her
nine times. He also shot Tamika's 21-month-old sister, Kenya.1
After Goins left, Tamika called 911 and identified Goins to the
operator as the shooter. When police arrived, they found that all of the
members of the Jones family had been shot. Both parents and three
children were dead. Only Tamika and Kenya survived. The forensic
evidence showed that all of the victims had been shot multiple times with
a .45 caliber Glock pistol.
2
Two subsequent searches of the home ofGoins's girlfriend, Monique
Littlejohn, yielded an unfired .45 cartridge which matched those used in
the killings and the instruction manual for a Glock pistol lying near some
men's clothing.
3
A jury found Goins guilty of the capital murder of one of the
children based on the killing of more than one person in the same act or
1 Goinsv. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442,447-8,470 S.E.2d 114,119
(1996).
2 Id. at 448,470 S.E.2d at 119.
3 Id. at 449-50, 470 S.E.2d at 120.
4 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(7).
5 Goins, 251 Va. at 447,470 S.E.2d at 118.
6 Id. at 451,470 S.E.2d at 121.
transaction. 4 He was also found guilty of four counts of first degree
murder and two of malicious wounding, as well as seven counts of the use
of a firearm in commission of a felony.
5
At the penalty phase of the trial, the Commonwealth presented the
testimony of a police detective who stated that eight months prior to the
shootings he had arrested Goins for possession of crack cocaine. Goins
did not appear for trial and was wanted on that charge at the time of the
shootings. The state also presented the testimony of the medical exam-
iner, who stated that several of the children may have been shot after they
were unconscious or dead.
6
In mitigation, the defense presented testimony that Goins's mother
was an abusive drug addict, and that drug addiction and crime were
prevalent in the Goins family. The jury also heard testimony that "Goins
was devastated when his grandmother died, because she was the only
person who had shown him any love." 7 The jury fixed thepunishment for
the capital murder conviction at death, based upon their finding both of
the aggravating factors, future dangerousness and vileness.8
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia, after reviewing the record and
disposing of multiple claims, 9 found that the sentence was not imposed
7 Id. at 452, 470 S.E.2d at 122.
8 Id. at 447, 470 S.E.2d at 119.
9 The court made specific rulings on certain issues which will not
be dealt with here at length:
1) the admissibility of photographs and videotapes is in the
discretion of the trial court, and the fact that they are gruesome
